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Child poverty in the German social investment state
Kinderarmut im deutschen Sozialinvestitionsstaat
Abstract:
In the last years child poverty in Germany has be-
come a political issue. However, child poverty
rates are relatively high and even on the rise.
Against this backdrop we will analyse the strat-
egy of the federal government to fight child pov-
erty in Germany. We will demonstrate that the
federal government uses a ‘child-centred social
investment strategy’ (cf. Esping-Andersen 2002)
as a blueprint. By analysing measures and in-
struments of the German anti-poverty Strategy,
we will make clear that this strategy is not com-
pletely put into effect. Whereas Esping-Andersen
propagates a fine balance of social services and
financial transfers, the German government un-
derestimates the relevance of material redistribu-
tion and focuses predominantly on social services
and education. This is not by chance but can be
understood as a consequence of the conceptual
limits of the social investment ideology. To guar-
antee generational justice and to make sure that
children will receive a fair share of societal re-
sources in a rich country we plea for a children’s
rights-based approach to fight child poverty.
Key words: child poverty, social investment ap-
proach, children’s rights, policies concerning
children and families
Zusammenfassung:
Kinderarmut wurde in Deutschland in den letzten
Jahren verstärkt zum Gegenstand der politischen
Debatte. Dennoch sind die Armutsraten bei Kin-
dern hoch und steigen sogar weiter an. Vor diesem
Hintergrund analysieren wir in dem vorliegenden
Beitrag die Strategie der Bundesregierung zur Be-
kämpfung der Kinderarmut in Deutschland. Dabei
zeigen wir auf, dass die Bundesregierung ihr dies-
bezügliches politisches Handeln auf eine „kindzen-
trierte Investitionsstrategie“ (Esping-Andersen
2002) aufbaut. Anhand der Analyse der Maßnah-
men und Instrumente zur Kinderarmutsbekämp-
fung arbeiten wir heraus, dass diese Strategievor-
lage allerdings nicht vollständig umgesetzt wird.
Während Esping-Andersen eine ausgewogene Ba-
lance zwischen sozialen Dienstleistungen und fi-
nanziellen Transfers propagiert, unterschätzt die
Bundesregierung die Bedeutsamkeit materieller
Umverteilung und fokussiert ihr Handeln einseitig
auf soziale Dienstleistungen und Bildung. Dies ge-
schieht keinesfalls zufällig, sondern kann als Folge
der konzeptuellen Schwächen der Sozialinvesti-
tionsideologie verstanden werden. Um Generatio-
nengerechtigkeit zu gewährleisten und um sicher-
zustellen, dass Kinder einen gerechten Anteil an
den gesellschaftlichen Ressourcen in einem reichen
Land erhalten, plädieren wir zur Bekämpfung der
Kinderarmut für einen Ansatz, der auf den Rechten
der Kinder basiert.
Schlagworte: Kinderarmut, Sozialinvestition,
Kinderrechte, Kinder- und Familienpolitik
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1. Introduction
Since the late 1980s the structure of poverty in Germany has changed significantly.
Whereas in the past there was a high proportion of elder people living in poverty, since
the early 1990s Germany has been faced with an increase in poverty among children and
families. Since that time, children comprise the group at greatest risk of living in poverty.
Consequently, we are witnessing an increase in political efforts to fight child poverty.
Yet, a shift in the political strategy has taken place. In the past the German welfare state
primarily focused on reducing the material deprivation of children and families by ex-
tending family-related social spending. Nowadays, under the rule of the concept of the
‘social investment state’, investing in human capital has become a key concept. Accord-
ingly, investing in human capital is considered the best way of preparing for a future in a
globalised world and knowledge-based economy. Lack of access to knowledge and fewer
(or even the absence of) skills are the new social risks of the knowledge-based economy.
Rather than being provided with direct security through mechanisms of redistribution,
citizens are equipped through this process of investment to negotiate their own integration
into the labour market. The new form of security provided by the social investment state
is the capacity to face these risks in the market. The other central component of the social
investment state is the participation of most citizens in the labour force, in order to secure
social cohesion and economic competiveness. Under the social investment principle the
goal of social policy shifts from achieving social equality by redistribution of resources to
achieving social inclusion by producing employability. The means to reach this goal are
activation in the labour market and life-long learning. If it is to be the case that all public
expenditures should have a pay-off, a return on investment, then this has definite conse-
quences for the selection of target groups. This is in no small part due to the fact that the
pay-off of public measures in some sectors is higher than in others. Here we can see the
reason why children and families are so important in the process of restructuring modern
welfare states. Children and women represent the maximum potential of productivity, and
seem to make public intervention notably more productive and profitable.
The ‘turn to investment’ in German policies concerning children and families came
into effect during the red-green coalition’s second term under Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder. The Minister for Family Affairs, Renate Schmidt (SPD), developed a new con-
cept labelled ‘sustainable family policy’. With the help of this concept the fertility rate
should be increased, the reconciliation of family and work should be improved, the edu-
cational level of pupils in Germany should be raised and the poverty of children and
families should be reduced. The concept of ‘sustainable family policy’ is considered an
important contribution to economic growth and competitiveness of the German economy.
The German strategy to fight child poverty is part of this broader concept of ‘sustain-
able family policy’. This means that goals like material equality, social security, distribu-
tive justice and even children’s social rights are secondary to the economic calculations
and the productive logic of investing in human capital. Hereby, it is the ‘child-centred so-
cial investment strategy’ (cf. Esping-Andersen 2002) which serves as a blue-print. In ac-
cordance with this concept money and culture are identified as the central causal mecha-
nisms for the inheritance of life chances. To overcome the inheritance of life chances and
to guarantee a maximum of investments in the next generation, Esping-Andersen argues
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for a double strategy: On the one hand, he pleas for an inclusion of fathers and mothers
into the labour market as well as an expansion of economic transfers for families to im-
prove their material welfare. On the other hand, he propagates the expansion of high
quality early childcare and education, especially for children under the age of three in or-
der to improve the cultural capital – above all for children of deprived families.
In the following, we will explore the strategies, instruments and effects of policies in-
tended to fight child poverty in Germany. The first step involves reconstructing the federal
government’s concept of child poverty as well as the rationale behind the political strategy
(section 2). Secondly, the measures and instruments implemented to fight child poverty and
their effects will be analysed (section 3). Once these have been established, the limits of a
social-investment strategy against child poverty will be discussed (section 4).
2. Child poverty from the perspective of the German federal government
For over a decade, fighting child poverty has been a central issue of the German federal
government. The goal of fighting the poverty of children and families is explicitly men-
tioned in all three coalition agreements since the end of the Chancellor Kohl (1982-1998)
era. The red-green government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder propagated in its coa-
lition agreement from 1998: “Fighting against poverty is a crucial issue of the political
strategy of the new federal government – above all the poverty of children has to be re-
duced” (SPD/Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998: 30). Also the second red-green coalition em-
phasized: “We will make every effort to reduce family poverty” (SPD/Bündnis 90/Die
Grünen 2002: 30). Similarly, the coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD poignantly declared in
2005: “We will reduce material child poverty” (CDU/CSU/SPD 2005: 118). The National
Action Plan ‘For a child-oriented Germany 2005-2010’ (NAP) identifies the fight against
child poverty and the provision of a decent standard of living for all children as one of six
central political goals in the field of child and family policy (cf. BMFSFJ 2006a: 60).
2.1 Child poverty: major issue or marginal problem?
In contrast to these ambitious political goals, the federal government tends to downplay
the dimension of child poverty in Germany by trivialising the problem. In particular, this
can be observed in the Third National Poverty and Wealth Report published in 2008 by
the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (cf. BMAS 2008a). In order to de-
scribe the quantitative dimension of child poverty in Germany at least two different data-
bases are available – the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). According to the EU-SILC data (2005),
in Germany only 12% of children under the age of 15 and 13% of the total population
were living in poverty (60% threshold). However, the SOEP data for the same year states
that 26% of children under the age of 15 and 18% of the total population lived in poverty.
As we see, the SOEP data indicates a child poverty rate more than twice as high as the
EU-SILC data suggests, and that child poverty is significantly higher than the poverty of
the total population (cf. figure 1).
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Figure 1: Poverty rate in different data-bases (60% poverty line; median): total population
and children under the age of 15 (1998-2005)
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Source: BMAS 2008a: 293-294.
Although the deficits of the EU-SILC data base are explicitly discussed in the scientific
background report to the Third National Poverty and Wealth Report, the federal govern-
ment, nevertheless, highlights the EU-SILC data, whereas SOEP data only play a mar-
ginal role.
Given the widespread critique of the EU-SILC data, the federal government’s prefer-
ence for these figures is hardly convincing, and has, as such, lead to heavy criticism of the
government’s Third National Poverty and Wealth Report (cf. Hauser 2008a, b; DCV
2008a; DPWV 2008; VAMV 2008). Critics emphasize the following: EU-SILC is ac-
quiring data via a questionnaire written only in German. This means that, e.g., poor mi-
grant households are underrepresented in this data. Additionally, family households with
young children are also underrepresented, whereas households of better educated and
fully-employed persons are overrepresented. When comparing EU-SILC and SOEP data
with the Microcensus, which, in turn, serves as official representative statistics of the
German population, the SOEP data seem to draw a more realistic picture of the German
population, and thus of child poverty in Germany (cf. DIW et al. 2007: VII-VIII; see also
Hauser 2008a: 430, Hauser 2008b).
Relying on EU-SILC data, the federal government ranks Germany among the coun-
tries with the lowest child poverty rates compared to other European countries (cf.
BMFSFJ 2008b: 32). Comparative analyses by both the OECD and UNICEF, however,
come to a different conclusion. According to the OECD study Growing unequal, the
Scandinavian states have the lowest child poverty rates among the 30 OECD countries
(Denmark 3%, Finland 4%, Sweden 4%, Norway 5%). Turkey (25%), Poland (22%),
Mexico (22%) and the USA (21%), on the other hand, are at the top of the list. Hence,
Germany is quite far from the Scandinavian role models. The OECD study calculates a
child poverty rate of 16% for children under the age of 18 – i.e. below the 50% threshold.
This means that Germany ranks in the lower middle of the OECD countries and is very
close to New Zealand (15%), Italy (16%), Ireland (16%), Portugal (17%) and Spain
(17%) – countries that are not characterized by an extensive social security system, much
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less by measures specifically aimed at children. It is not only the relatively high child
poverty rate, but also the fact that children are affected by poverty more than other popu-
lation groups that Germany shares with these countries (cf. OECD 2008: 154). Further-
more, a recent UNICEF study An overview of child well-being in rich countries (cf.
UNICEF 2007) confirms Germany’s position in comparison to other OECD countries.
Following a multidimensional approach (material well-being, health and safety, educa-
tional well-being, family and peer-relationships, behaviours and risks, subjective well-
being) this study compares children’s well-being in 21 of the 30 OECD countries. Ac-
cording to UNICEF, Germany reaches a middle rank with regard to both the single di-
mension of material well-being (ranking 13th out of the 21 OECD countries included in
this study) as well as in all six dimensions combined (ranking 11th) (cf. UNICEF 2007: 2,
see also Bertram 2008).
2.2 Is gainful employment the best measure to fight child poverty?
As discussed above, the German federal government acts on the assumption that child
poverty, seen from a quantitative perspective, is no major issue. Thus, fighting poverty is
not a top priority in the concept of ‘sustainable family policy’. Nevertheless, the German
government has launched measures and programs to reduce child poverty. Under the rule
of the social investment principle they are not focused on economic transfers for children
and families. Instead the new leitmotif is: “Gainfully employed parents are the best pro-
tection against child poverty” (BMFSFJ 2009). Taking into account the relatively low
proportion of mothers in gainful employment, above all the German government has to
increase the participation of mothers in the labour market (cf. Rürup/Gruescu 2003). On
this point the federal government is completely in line with influential scientific experts
like Esping-Andersen (cf. 2002) and international organisations like the OECD and the
EU.
The belief that the gainful employment of both parents is the best measure for fighting
child poverty derives from empirical evidence. Following empirical studies child poverty
is low when both parents are gainfully employed (cf. BMFSFJ 2008a: 21). Although this
is generally true, under specific conditions this strategy has its limitations – especially
when it comes to lone parents. For example, even if one parent is fully employed, one of
ten children lives in poverty (cf. Strengmann-Kuhn 2006: 448). This is due to recent
trends in the German labour market. The proportion of the ‘working poor’1 has nearly
doubled in the period between 1998 and 2006. Recently, one third of all employees were
considered to be ‘working poor’ (cf. DIW et al. 2007: VI). From this, the National Action
Plan concludes: “Part-time employment or employment in the so-called low-wage sector
is not enough to support a large family” (BMFSFJ 2006a: 61). However, recent efforts to
increase the participation of fathers and mothers in the labour market failed to increase the
working hours of mothers. Even though the employment of women showed a slight in-
crease of 2.8% between 2001 and 2006, the number of working hours of women did not
rise. Instead, the average working hours of all women (full- and part-time employment)
                                                          
1 The working poor are defined as employed persons with an income of less than two-thirds of the av-
erage gross income of all employees.
Zeitschrift für Familienforschung, 21. Jahrg., Heft 2/2009, S. 150-167 155
declined by more than 1 hour per week to 29.1 hours (cf. Kümmerling et al. 2008). This
means that the contribution of gainfully employed mothers to the family income remains
relatively low. The expansion of the so-called low-wage sector and negative incentives
for married women by the joint tax assessment of married couples (Ehegattensplitting) are
identified as major contributing factors. According to the regulations established in 1958,
the income of both married partners is initially added together, and then halved to calcu-
late the tax owed. This form of taxation results in a tax saving when compared to taxes as-
sessed on an individual basis – the greater the difference between the incomes of the cou-
ple the more they profit. For this reason the joint tax assessment of married couples is
identified by experts as producing negative incentives for the participation of married
women in the labour market (cf. Dingeldey 2002; Bach et al. 2003).
To briefly sum it up: the expansion of the so-called low-wage sector, shrinking real
wages and the joint taxation of married couples increasingly undermine the prerequisites of
this employment strategy that, in turn, intends to serve as a buffer against child poverty.
2.3 Redistribution by the state
Although redistribution of material resources plays no significant role in the social in-
vestment approach, the German federal government is quite aware of the impact of eco-
nomic transfers on children and families. For example, the impact of the universal child
benefit on the material well-being of children of lone parents and children in large fami-
lies is acknowledged. In large families the child benefit comprises 15%, in lone-parent
households with one child 10% of the total income and in lone parent households with
two children up to 21% (cf. BMFSFJ 2008a: 29-30, see also BMAS 2008a: 88). Child-
related financial transfers are intended to compensate for the cost of raising children and
the loss of one income associated with the birth of a child.
Based on similar findings, the German government infers that “the welfare state is ef-
fective” (BMAS 2008b) – as the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, Olaf Scholz,
stated in May of 2008. The Third National Poverty and Wealth Report declares: “Trans-
fers like unemployment benefit II, child benefits, children’s allowance, housing benefits
and parental leave benefits significantly reduce the income poverty of families. Public
transfers, for example, reduce the poverty risk of children by nearly two-thirds from 34%
to 12%” (BMAS 2008a: 87-88). The federal Ministry of Family Affairs propagates almost
the same: “Compared to other nations Germany is relatively successful in reducing the
risk of poverty by social transfers and financial provision for families” (BMFSFJ 2008a:
49). The Ministry assumes that the German welfare state has halved child poverty in
Germany from 31% to 14%. This means that Germany ranks in the middle among the
EU-15 (BMFSFJ 2008a: 26).
Whereas the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Family Affairs
– based upon EU-SILC-data – draw a very optimistic picture of the efficiency of the
German welfare state, the OECD-study Growing unequal indicates a reduction rate of
only circa 40%. It is noteworthy that the reduction rate by state redistribution in Germany
is still quite far away from the leading Scandinavian countries – as, for example, Denmark
with a reduction of circa 80%. Moreover, other countries utilizing state redistribution like
the Czech Republic, France, UK, Belgium, Australia and New Zealand have higher re-
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duction rates of child poverty. However, given the reduction rates for the working-age
population and the retirement-age population, the German welfare state is principally able
to reach a higher rate of redistribution. Whereas the welfare state reduces poverty among
children by circa 40%, it is nearly 60% for the working-age population and more than
80% for the retirement-age population (cf. OECD 2008: 142).
How the relatively low reduction rate of the German welfare system affects the child
poverty rate is dramatically demonstrated by a direct comparison to Finland. Prior to the
state redistribution, UNICEF calculated nearly the same child poverty rate for both Ger-
many and Finland (Germany 18.2% and Finland 18.1%). Whereas the Finish welfare state
has managed to reduce and sustain a child poverty rate of 2.8% by means of taxes and
transfers, the German welfare state has only been able to reduce it to 10.2% (cf. UNICEF
2005: 21).
2.4 Expansion of early childhood education and care
In contrast to the marginal role of financial transfers for children and families, the expan-
sion of non-family childcare, especially for children under the age of three, stands centre
stage in the German strategy to fight child poverty. Early childhood care and education
has a twofold meaning in this context. Firstly, by extending places in childcare facilities
the reconciliation of family and work should be improved for mothers. Secondly, the aim
is to invest in the human capital of children as early as possible. This is based on the as-
sumption that investing in early childhood education has significant long-term human
capital and economic returns. This is especially true for children of deprived families.
High quality early childhood education is regarded as being able to compensate for defi-
cits in cognitive stimulation in their families and in so doing improving their life chances
and ability to overcome the reproduction of social inequality (cf. Esping-Andersen 2002,
2005; Carneiro/Heckman 2003; see also Olk 2007).
The relevance of investing in early childhood care and education is clear when looking
at countries with low child poverty rates – all of which invest more in early childcare insti-
tutions than Germany. In fact, the 7th Family Report demonstrates a significant backlog in
demand regarding expenditures for in-kind-transfers for children and families compared to
Denmark, which is one of the most successful welfare states in fighting child poverty.
Whereas Germany spends 0.8% of its GDP for such in-kind-transfers, in Denmark it is
2.3%. However, it must be stated that also with respect to cash transfers a backlog demand
can be identified. A direct comparison shows that Denmark spends 1.5% of its GDP for
monetary transfers for families and Germany only 1.1% (cf. BMFSFJ 2006b: 39).
3. Measures concerning child poverty
In the following section we discuss measures and programs that were implemented by the
German government to fight child poverty. First, we will analyse social services for chil-
dren and families, and then focus on financial transfers.
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3.1 Early childhood education and care
As mentioned above, the German government is focusing its anti-poverty strategy on a
quantitative expansion and qualitative improvement of the system of early childhood
education and care. The first step in this direction is the legislation concerning the ex-
pansion of early childcare for children under the age of three (Tagesbetreuungsaus-
baugesetz), which was launched in January of 2005. With the help of this law roughly
230,000 additional places for children under the age of three are to be created by 2010.
In accordance with this law, the local authorities responsible for financing early child-
care and education are requested to identify the need for childcare at the local level and
to offer no fewer than the number of places for children of this age, whose parents are
either both gainfully employed, are participating in vocational courses or participating in
reintegration measures organised by the new social assistance system for long-term un-
employed. To improve the quality of early childhood education the new law necessitates
the implementation of an educational concept as well as the regular evaluation of child-
care facilities. To implement this law 1.5 billion euros p.a. have been pledged till 2010
(cf. Meysen/Schindler 2004).
The coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD – which came into power in 2005 – followed
the strategy of expanding places in early childhood care and education. The new legisla-
tion aimed at supporting children (Kinderförderungsgesetz), which came into effect in
January 2009, will increase the provision rate for children under the age of three from
the present 14% to 35% by 2013 – and thus will close in on the international standard.
Thus, around 500,000 new places in crèches and with child minders need to be created.
The federal government is contributing a share of 4 billion euros to the total costs of 12
billion euros. Moving beyond the former legislation the new legislation also addresses
parents who are seeking a job. By 2013, the criteria for eligibility will be dropped in fa-
vour of a general right to a place in early childcare for every child between the age of
one and three.
As in all other OECD countries, in Germany parents are considered the best caregiv-
ers for their children during the first year of life. Economic transfers enable one of the
parents to take over this responsibility. The former child-raising allowance introduced by
the conservative government in the early 1980s utilized a flatrate (450€ for 12 months or
300€ for 24 months). This meant that the opportunity costs, especially for middle- and
high-income families, were relatively high. In 2007, this regulation was replaced with the
new parental leave benefit. The central aim of the parental leave benefit is to reduce the
opportunity costs associated with raising a child – especially for highly educated women.
As such, mothers or fathers who interrupt their employment to care for their child should
receive 67% of their average net income from the prior year – with a maximum of 1,800 €
per month – for up to 12 months. To motivate fathers to take more responsibility in caring
for their child(ren) two months of paid parental leave were reserved for them. Parents
who did not work in the months prior to giving birth are eligible to receive a monthly
payment of 300 €. The parental leave can even be divided between the two parents. How-
ever, two months are reserved for the parent who continued working, which is usually the
father (the so-called daddy quota). Lone parents are eligible for a parental leave of up to
14 months. The new parental leave scheme pursues several different aims. The primary
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aim is to reduce opportunity costs for the caring parent. Second, by reducing the duration
of the new parental leave to a maximum of 12 months per person mothers can be better
(re-)integrated into the labour market. Third, incentives for giving birth to more children
should be induced. By this, it was accepted that primarily families with higher incomes
profit more from this law than poor people who have even fewer benefits than under the
previous system (they receive 300 € per month, but only for 14 months instead of 24
months) (cf. Blome et al. 2008: 348; Felix 2008). Even though low-income families are
confronted with a reduction of social benefits by this parental leave scheme, the federal
government declared this law to be a milestone in the fight against child poverty (cf.
BMFSFJ 2008b: 39-40).
3.2 Financial transfers
Traditionally, German family policy was dominated by the principle of the ‘dual system’
of financial support for families, which is based on a combination of tax-free allowances
and child benefit payments (cf. Münch 1990: 72ff.). The ‘dual system’ was abolished in
1996 to the extent that potential claimants now have to decide between the two options,
depending on which is more beneficial to them. At the same time, the amount of the child
benefit was linked to the subsistence minimum level for children, which means that the
child benefit has to be raised parallel to the increase of the subsistence minimum costs for
a child. Child benefits are intended to compensate parents for expenditures on children,
and thus to assure a redistribution between households with and without children (hori-
zontal distribution). This means, however, that this measure is not conceptualized to fight
child poverty.
Since the end of the Kohl era in 1998, the child benefit has been raised several times –
the sum total of which was 50% (1998: 110 €, 2009: 164 € for the first child). However,
child poverty is still on the rise. This situation emphasizes that child poverty can not be
reduced by only increasing this universal benefit. Against this backdrop, the value of fi-
nancial transfers as a means of fighting child poverty has generally met with scepticism
within the public debate. In contrast, it can be argued that – as mentioned in section 2 –
universal transfers can definitely contribute to prevent child poverty, but only to a certain
extent. For example, based on micro simulations of the impacts of different child benefit
packages in the EU-15, Matsaganis and his colleagues demonstrated that universal child
benefit could have a considerable redistributive impact if pitched at a high enough level.
While the potential of universal child benefits is very real, alone they are not capable of
eliminating child poverty in all of the countries investigated. A key finding of this study
is, that combining a universal benefit with targeted policies could be the most effective
(and most cost-efficient) way of reducing child poverty in the countries studied (cf. Mat-
saganis et al 2004, see for similar finding Levy et al. 2007).
A small, but insufficient step in this direction is the ‘supplementary benefit for chil-
dren’ (Kinderzuschlag) proposed in 2005. The ‘supplementary benefit for children’ was
launched by the federal government as a means-tested instrument to help fight child pov-
erty. The ‘supplementary benefit for children’ would provide up to 140 € per child per
month, and can be claimed by parents of unmarried children under the age of 25. The eli-
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gibility criterion is that the parents have an income that is sufficient to cover their own
needs, but who, due to the additional needs of their child(ren), would be eligible for the
‘unemployment benefit II’ (based on the Social Security Law II).
From the very beginning, the effectiveness and range of the ‘supplementary benefit
for children’ was criticised. Complex and restrictive bureaucratic procedures resulted in a
high rejection rate (cf. Becker/Hauser 2008). Hence, already in 2005 the coalition of
CDU/CSU and SPD announced in their coalition agreement to reform the ‘supplementary
benefit for children’ (cf. CDU/CSU/SPD 2005: 118). However, the reform was imple-
mented no earlier than October of 2008, at which time the application procedure was sim-
plified: The income that parents have to reach to be eligible for this benefit is no longer
calculated individually but as the general sum (900 € for couples and 600 € for lone par-
ents). Additionally, the former limit of a 36 months maximum participation was dropped
and regulations for additional earnings became more generous. This reform was the re-
sponse to the fact that the main goals of the ‘supplementary benefit for children’ could not
be realized. Neither the initially intended number of children and families who should
profit from the benefit, nor the intention to support “gainful employment instead of un-
employment” and to “make work pay” for unemployed parents were attainable (cf. CDU/
CSU/SPD 2005: 118). At the moment, the approval rate for the supplementary benefit is
18%. This means that only 100,000 instead of the initially planned 150,000 children profit
from the benefit (cf. BMFSFJ 2008c: 10). Furthermore, an evaluation makes clear that the
‘supplementary benefit for children’ did not significantly increase the employment rate
among parents who receive this benefit (cf. BMFSFJ 2008c: 10).
Despite the reform in 2008, experts continue to demand further improvements to the
benefit. For making sure that more children from low-income families profit from this
‘supplementary benefit for children’, most of these recommendations plea for an expan-
sion of its range. The Catholic charity organisation Deutscher Caritasverband (DCV),
for example, demands that parents should have the right to choose between the ‘supple-
mentary benefit for children’ and the ‘unemployment benefit II’ in order to reduce the
‘hidden poverty’. The DCV also criticises that additional income of the parents still re-
duces the amount of the ‘supplementary benefit for children’ by too great an amount.
This effect is so influential because the income of the parents is also taken into account
with respect to other financial transfers like the housing benefit. This cumulative effect
may cause a reduction of the ‘supplementary benefit for children’ by as much as 80%,
which effectively means that work does not pay. In particular, the income threshold was
criticised because parents who cross this threshold lose their eligibility abruptly. In cer-
tain circumstances this means that an increase in the parental net income by 60 € can re-
sult in a loss of 115 € in household income. Thus, the DCV proposes a decrease in the
income threshold, i.e. to take less of the additional income of parents into account and to
increase the amount of the benefit in order to meet the children’s needs more adequately
(cf. DCV 2008b).
Under the label ‘supplementary payment for children’ (Kindergeldzuschlag), Irene
Becker and Richard Hauser make a similar plea for a reform of the ‘supplementary bene-
fit for children’ (cf. Becker/Hauser 2008). As an autonomous transfer, the ‘supplementary
payment for children’ shall guarantee a means-tested basic income for all children in low-
income families regardless of parents’ employment status. As a result the ‘supplementary
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payment for children’ would be separated from the demands and burdens of the activating
employment policy (‘no rights without responsibilities’).
Both reform options are based on the principle of an autonomous basic income for chil-
dren separate from the occupational status of the parents. However, both reform options fo-
cus on reforming individual measures instead of reforming the whole system. A radical
concept was propagated by an alliance including charity organisations, children’s rights or-
ganisations as well as influential child and poverty researchers, etc. With the help of this
concept the wide variety of fragmented transfers like child benefits, the ‘supplementary
benefit for children’, social assistance for children, joint tax assessment of married couples
(Ehegattensplitting), etc. shall be combined into one unified basic income for children (cf.
Bündnis Kindergrundsicherung 2009). The alliance argues that all children should have the
same rights regardless of their parents’ occupational status, and proposes a basic income of
about 500 € per month until the age of 27. In addition to meeting children’s basic needs this
would also provide them with the opportunity to participate in higher education. This meas-
ure shall be means-tested, and thus the amount of the benefit will decrease as the income of
the family household rises by means of taxation. Although a basic income of this kind
would come close to meeting the standards stated in the Declaration of the Rights of the
Child of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the federal
government has thus far not been very supportive of this kind of measure.
3.3 Children in the social assistance system
At the present time, around two million children live in families receiving benefits based on
the Social Security Law II (Sozialgesetzbuch II). This measure is supposed to defray the ba-
sic needs of its recipients. However, the amount of this benefit for children continues to be
criticised because it does not cover their primary needs. This inadequacy is due to the pro-
cedure by which the standard rate for this benefit is calculated. From a child-related per-
spective it can be criticised that children only receive a reduced share of the benefit of an
adult. Children under the age of 15 receive monthly 60% (211 €) and children above this
age 80% (281 €) of the standard rate for an adult (351 €). Lone parents receive an additional
amount and there is even extra money if a child is born, for longer school trips, etc. The
major issues are (1) that the benefit for children is not calculated on the basis of their needs
but derived as a percentage share from the standard rate for an adult and (2) that two age
groups are insufficient to cover the needs of this population group (cf. Spellbrink 2008: 16).
For example, the benefit for a child’s daily nutrition is only 2.54 € for children under
15 years of age and 3.42 € for children over this age. However, the average cost of
healthy and balanced meals for a child is 4.68 € per day. Following these calculations the
rate of 2.54 € is only enough for children ages 4 to 6 – and only if the parents restrict
themselves to special offers (cf. Spellbrink 2008: 7). Furthermore, the costs associated
with education are completely excluded from the calculation of the standard rate for chil-
dren. This is in sharp contrast to the social investment ideology and is not in line with the
political goal of overcoming the social inheritance of children of deprived families by
means of the educational system.
With the help of new regulation for families (Familienleistungsgesetz) introduced in
January of 2009 and as part of a broader economic stimulus package (Konjunkturpaket II)
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adopted in February of 2009, some improvements were implemented. With the former
came a slight increase2 in the child benefit as well as a tax exemption for dependent chil-
dren and an expansion of household-related services. Low-income households, however,
are excluded from the improvements of this regulation. Due to the fact that the child bene-
fit is reducing the amount of the ‘unemployment benefit II’ which the parent(s) receive(s),
in the end the increase in the child benefit does not raise the household income. Further-
more, low-income families are unable to profit from tax exemptions because their income
falls below the threshold of taxation, i.e. is too low to be taxed. Due to the new regulation
for families, school children in households receiving ‘unemployment benefit II’ are eligi-
ble for 100 € p.a. for school material. Even here it remains debatable whether or not this
amount is sufficient. One leading child rights organisation arrived at an amount much
higher – at least 300 € p.a. (cf. DKSB 2008).
The ‘economic stimulus package II’ grants all recipients of child benefit a lump sum
of 100 € per child, whereby this benefit does not reduce other social benefits like the ‘un-
employment benefit II’. Additionally, the standard rate for children will be differentiated
in three instead of the existing two age groups: As of July 2009, children up to 6 years of
age will receive 60% of the standard rate for an adult, children between 7 and 14 years of
age will receive 70% and children above 14 will receive 80%. While this represents an
improvement of the overall benefit, the problem remains that the benefit is not derived
from the children’s needs, but rather calculated as a percentage reduction of the standard
rate for an adult.
This critique was also formulated by a decision of the Federal Social Court (Bundes-
sozialgericht) in January of 2009. The main thrust of the court’s decision was a strong
suspicion that the standard rate for children under 15 years of age is unconstitutional (cf.
Bundessozialgericht 2009). Criticised was not the amount of the benefit, but the missing
rationale. With regard to an issue as important as the minimum living standard, the needs
of children must be a stand-alone calculation and not simply be deduced from the stan-
dard rate for an adult. Among other things, this situation violates the dignity of man and
goes against the ‘welfare state imperative’ (Sozialstaatsgebot) as stipulated in the German
Basic Law. The Federal Social Court has passed its decision on to the Federal Constitu-
tional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), so that the issue can finally be clarified. At the
moment, it is still open how the Federal Constitutional Court will decide.
4. Why does the German strategy against child poverty fail?
Since the late 1990s the fight against child poverty has been propagated as an important
political goal by all of the federal governments that came into power during this period.
Nevertheless, it must be stated that there has been no breakthrough concerning the
achievement of this goal. According to UNICEF (cf. 2005), since the beginning of the 21st
century Germany is one of the few nations where child poverty has been on the rise. Irre-
spective of the calculating procedure, the child poverty rate in Germany is at best in the
                                                          
2 The child benefit was increased for the first and the second child by 10 € and by 16 € for the third
and all further child(ren).
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middle field of the OECD countries. Thus, Germany is still quite far away from its own
self-proclaimed aim of substantially reducing child poverty.
However, this situation has not come about due to heavy cuts in the field of benefits
for children and families. Quite the contrary is true: Whereas since the 1990s social bene-
fits in other fields such as labour market and employment policies have been reduced, so-
cial transfers for children and families have continuously been expanded (cf. e.g. Seelaib-
Kaiser 2002). Due to the new parental leave scheme, for instance, expenditures for chil-
dren and families were increased from 2.85 billion euros to circa 4 billion euros p.a. (cf.
Müller-Heine 2006: 62). Furthermore, the federal state has earmarked 4 billion euros to
help finance the massive expansion of places in crèches and with childminders – ap-
proximately one-third of the total costs (cf. BMFSFJ 2008a: 45).
Hence, the unsatisfying effects of the anti-poverty strategy can not be entirely ac-
counted for by the amount of money spent, but rather on what it is spent. As already dis-
cussed, the measures are focused on the social investment principle. This means that all
measures and programs have to demonstrate or prove their contribution to economic
growth and the building of human capital. In contrast, criteria like equality, security and
well-being play a minor role. In its anti-child-poverty strategy the German government
uses the ‘child-centred social investment strategy’ formulated by Esping-Andersen (cf.
Esping-Andersen 2002, see also Esping-Andersen 2005) as a blueprint. However,
whereas Esping-Andersen developed a coherent political strategy, the initiatives and pro-
grams of the German government so far remain piecemeal and fragmented.
4.1 Financial transfers
At first glance, the political strategy against poverty in Germany fits with the principles of
the social investment paradigm. This is due to the fact that the plan to reduce child pov-
erty utilizes a policy mix concerning in-cash and in-kind-transfers (cf. BMFSFJ 2008a:
49). However, the improvement of incomes for families with children focuses on the rec-
onciliation of work and family – especially for mothers. In contrast to this, the expansion
of financial transfers concerning children and families plays only a marginal role. Ac-
cordingly, the child benefit – understood as a universal benefit – predominates, whereas
means-tested benefits for children in low-income families remain underdeveloped. For
example, as mentioned in paragraph 3.2, the ‘supplementary benefit for children’ is not
able to prevent a significant number of children and families from falling into pov-
erty. Furthermore, the new parental leave benefit is not able to improve the material
situation of low-income families because it privileges middle- and high-income fami-
lies. In order to effectively fight child poverty, a transformation of the system of the
fragmented financial benefits into a basic income for children that comprises univer-
sal as well as means-tested transfers would be required.
The expansion of financial transfers would not supplant the current political efforts to
increase the number of gainfully employed mothers. The introduction of the new parental
leave scheme as well as the massive expansion of places in childcare facilities are proof
that substantial steps in this direction have been taken. However, as demonstrated in para-
graph 2.2, the results of these efforts are still disappointing. In the first instance, this is
due to the contradictory incentives that measures from different policy fields concerning
Zeitschrift für Familienforschung, 21. Jahrg., Heft 2/2009, S. 150-167 163
female labour-market participation have established. Whereas policies concerning chil-
dren and families increasingly aim at the reconciliation of family and work, the political
promotion of the low-wage sector and, above all, the tax law (joint tax assessment of mar-
ried couples) produces contradictory efforts. From this follows that a substantial increase
in the labour-market participation of mothers requires joint action of different policy-
making sectors. While the Scandinavian countries rely on a strategy of ‘de-familiali-
sation’ of women by means of an individualized tax system, the German tax system sup-
ports the male-breadwinner family model, and thus, the familialisation of women. And it
is here that the German tax system undermines an important part of the German anti-
child-poverty strategy.
4.2 Early childhood education and care
As mentioned earlier, the material situation of low-income families has not been im-
proved by the new parental leave benefit. This situation did not develop by accident, but
follows a political agenda. The goal is to produce additional incentives for recipients of
‘unemployment benefit II’ to return to the labour market as soon as possible. Following
this argument, the intention is to (re)integrate the unemployed into the labour market by
cutting back on financial transfers. This is problematic for at least two reasons: First, the
reason that most unemployed parents are unemployed has more to do with a lack of avail-
able jobs than with a lack of motivation. Second, affordable day-care for children – espe-
cially for those under the age of three – is still not available in many regions. Hence, once
the child reaches one year of age and the new parental leave benefit runs out, the chal-
lenge of reconciling family and work returns.
Although, as mentioned in paragraph 3.1, there is the ambitious political goal to ex-
pand the number of places in childcare facilities during the next years, it remains ques-
tionable whether this goal can be reached within a relatively short period of time. This is
especially true against the backdrop of the current financial crisis and the chronic federal,
regional and local deficits. Additionally, the risk of a conflict between quantity and qual-
ity needs to be considered. In particular the relatively low level of qualification of child-
care workers, the inappropriate child-staff ratios and the urgent need for further educa-
tional training demonstrate that substantial qualitative improvements are needed in order
to reach the goal of overcoming the social inheritance of social inequality.
4.3 Investing in children vs. children’s rights
To sum up: the strategy to fight child poverty in Germany – as we have shown – has at
least two deficits. First, the importance of improving the material living conditions of
children by means of financial transfers continues to be underestimated. Instead, the ex-
pansion of social services – especially in the field of early childhood care and education –
takes centre stage. This is due to the social investment approach which emphasizes the in-
vestment in human capital as the key concept in the federal government’s attempts to
overcome child poverty. However, it remains debatable whether it is possible to develop
human capital under the harsh conditions of poverty and exclusion. Studies demonstrate
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that children who are living in impoverished conditions are not able to profit from the
high-quality educational facilities in the same way as children from more affluent families
(cf. Becker/Nietfeld 1999, Heintze 2004). Second, the political strategy to fight child pov-
erty in Germany remains fragmented and incoherent. Whereas the Scandinavian countries
have been relatively successful in combining generous material transfers for children and
families, incentives to encourage the employment of mothers as well as affordable high-
quality childcare, policies concerning children and families in Germany tend to prioritise
some singled-out goals against other goals, underestimate the relevance of means-tested
financial transfers and ignore the negative incentives of contradictory political measures.
Apart from the inherent shortcomings of the German strategy to fight child poverty
we have also identified structural deficits of a social investment approach for children and
families. The neglect of the material well-being of children and families in the here and
now within German policy concerning children and families is not accidental. As we have
shown measures and programs within social investment have to prove their contribution
to economic growth and productivity. Therefore, social investment policies focus on acti-
vating the economic potential of mothers as well as the investment in the human capital of
children. Criteria like generational equality, social security, and a decent standard of liv-
ing for children only play a marginal role. It is clear that no substantial improvement in
the material living conditions of children can be realized if it was solely based upon a fu-
ture-oriented approach relying on social investments. This does not mean, however, that
the social investment strategy is without merit. At the very least, it has drawn political at-
tention to children as a social category – even though this takes place in an instrumental
and future-oriented manner. This is the reason why the social investment approach has to
be complemented by a child-oriented approach, which focuses on the rights and needs of
children (cf. Olk/Wintersberger 2007). The conceptual weakness of the social investment
approach is that the redistribution of resources – e.g. from adults to children – is legiti-
mated exclusively by its effects on productivity. Investment contributes to the improve-
ment of the future human capital, economic growth and the wealth of the nation. At the
same time, this overlooks or leaves unacknowledged the fact that children as children are
full-fledged members of society. This means that they have “the right to share to the full
in the social heritage and to live the civilised life according to the standards prevailing in
society” (Marshall 1964: 82). Only if children are not understood exclusively as ‘citizen
workers of the future’, but instead acknowledged as full citizens in the here and now, can
a political strategy be developed which focuses on a fair share of societal resources for
children as children.
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